Brighton Rock by Graham Greene

In 1947 Donat O’Donnell wrote that â€Å"far more than the left-wing militancy of such poets as Auden and Spender†¦ the thrillers of Mr. Greene reflect the state of the West European mind in the thirties. † (25). For O'Donnell, Greene is â€Å"the most truly characteristic writer of the ‘thirties ir England, and the leading novelist of that time and place† (28). What Greene draws attention to in his novels from the period is, as McEwen notes, the condition of violence and savagery repressed beneath a seeming peace.Greene’s work such as Brighton Rock used the apparatus of the thriller to expose and investigate contemporary social problems; these novels are vehicles for social commentary particularly in the implicit equation they make between the violence and cruelty of their protagonists, Raven and Pinkie, and the background of poverty against which they are presented. This paper analyses Brighton Rock through a prism of narrative theory. In addi tion some socio-philosophical implications are discussed.Analysis In Brighton Rock Pinkie's gang murders Hale but only after he has made the acquaintance of Ida Arnold, a fun-loving pragmatist who repeatedly insists on her knowledge of the difference between right and wrong. Responding to an irrational compulsion—she calls herself a â€Å"sticker where right's concerned† (16)—she investigates Hale's death, seeking to bring Pinkie to justice and to save Rose the suffering that Pinkie will inflict upon her.Like Mather, Ida, despite fulfilling the role of the detective, is mocked by the narrative: her inability to see beneath the surface of things severely limits her understanding of the case and of the world she inhabits. Brighton for her is a place of fun and excitement, and life is always â€Å"good† (19, 72): â€Å"I always say it's fun to be alive† (17). The dark side, both of life and of the city with its beggars and its crime, is completely ali en to her (73):Death shocked her, life was so important. She wasn't religious. She didn't believe in heaven or hell, only in ghosts, ouija boards, tables which rapped . . . but to her death was the end of everything. . . . Life was sunlight on brass bedposts, Ruby port, the leap of the heart when the outsider you have backed passes the post and the colours go bobbing up. Life was poor Fred's mouth pressed down on hers in the taxi, vibrating with the engine along the parade. . .. she took life with deadly seriousness: she was prepared to cause any amount of unhappiness to anyone in order to defend the only thing she believed in. (36) Both her naive optimism, which has â€Å"something dangerous and remorseless† (36) in it, and her spiritual blindness prevent her from understanding Pinkie and Rose and account for the ironic tone that dominates many of the descriptions of Ida: Ida Arnold was on the right side. She was cheery, she was healthy, she could get a bit lit with the best of them.She liked a good time, her big breasts bore their carnality frankly down the Old Steyne, but you had only to look at her to know that you could rely on her. She wouldn't tell tales to your wife, she wouldn't remind you next morning of what you wanted to forget, she was honest, she was kindly, she belonged to the great middle law-abiding class, her amusements were their amusements, her superstitions their superstitions (the planchette scratching the French polish on the occasional table, and salt over the shoulder), she had no more love for anyone than they had. (80)This kind of mockery has led numerous critics to denigrate Ida for her lack of spiritual awareness (she boasts to Rose that â€Å"It's the world we got to deal with† [198]) and to elevate Pinkie to tragic stature because he professes a belief in a divine order (â€Å"it's the only thing that fits† [52], he says) wherein the crucial difference is not between right and wrong but between Good and Evil. In that Rose shares Pinkie's knowledge, she and Pinkie are presented both in the text and in critical discussions as morally superior to Ida and other characters like her such as Dallow, Cubitt, Colleoni, and Phil Corkery.The point is made particularly clear in comments made by Rose to Pinkie and in exchanges between Ida and Rose: â€Å"I only came here for your sake. I wouldn't have troubled to see you first, only I don't want to let the Innocent suffer†Ã¢â‚¬â€the aphorism came clicking out like a ticket from a slot machine. â€Å"Why, won't you lift a finger to stop him killing you? † â€Å"He wouldn't do me any harm. † â€Å"You're young. You don't know things like I do. † â€Å"There's things you don't know. † she brooded darkly by the bed while the woman argued on: a God wept in a garden and cried out upon a cross; Molly Carthew went to everlasting fire.â€Å"I know one thing you don't. I know the difference between Right and Wrong. They di dn't teach you that at school. † Rose didn't answer; the woman was quite right; the two words meant nothing to her. Their taste was extinguished by stronger foods—Good and Evil. The woman could tell her nothing she didn't know about these—she knew by tests as clear as mathematics that Pinkie was evil—what did it matter in that case whether he was right or wrong? (198) As is illustrated here, the narrative frequently contrasts two distinct views of the world—the secular outlook of Ida and others and the religious perception of Rose and Pinkie.From a social perspective there is no escaping the fact that Pinkie's evil makes him a criminal. However, as with Raven, Pinkie's guilt is mitigated by a background of poverty (â€Å"Man is made by the places in which he lives,† the text tells us [37]) and by the presence of Colleoni, a self-described â€Å"business man† (64), who, though the leader of a vast criminal organization, is also well reg arded by the Brighton police and by the Conservative party which seeks to persuade him into politics (159).As for Ida, whatever her shortcomings, she succeeds in her task of ridding society of Pinkie's menace, although the conditions that produced Pinkie, the source of the evil, remain. On one level, then, Ida is the instrument of law and order who brings about the socially desirable end, the social good, that Rose, representative of a religious or spiritual Good, cannot. Ida is, in this respect, a figure of the law defending a secular middle-class vision of society that relies on human justice which, as we have noted, Greene sees as both limited and limiting.On the other hand, criticism of Ida often seems to have at its root a prejudice against the detective story because it is a popular form of literature. Ida, herself, is strongly tied to popular culture, and in many respects she represents a populist spirit. The text tells us that â€Å"She was of the people, she cried in cinem as at David Copperfield, when she was drunk all the old ballads her mother had known came easily to her lips, her homely heart was touched by the word ‘tragedy'† (32). Similarly, her bed-sitting room contains the trappings of popular culture and an assortment of popular literature:pieces of china bought at the seaside, a photograph of Tom, an Edgar Wallace, a Netta Syrett from a second-hand stall, some sheets of music, The Good Companions, her mother's picture, more china, a few jointed animals made of wood and elastic, trinkets given her by this, that and the other, Sorrell and Son, the Board. (42) In one sense then, her success represents the triumph, albeit limited, of the popular. However, for critics like R. W. B. Lewis, Ida's â€Å"popular heart† (34) and her role as the investigating detective underpin the condemnation of her character and the neglect of her function in the book.In Lewis's eyes, the Ida Arnold plot threatens Brighton with the disaster of be ing two different books under the same cover (244): â€Å"The entertainment is Ida's; it begins with the first sentence . . . The tragedy is Pinkie's; it begins more subtly in the atmosphere of place† (243). As these remarks imply, not to condemn Ida is to elevate in their importance the book's detective-story aspects-something Lewis cannot and will not do. We can see in Brighton Rock how the detective story complements and underscores the narrative of Pinkie's religious struggle.To be fair, however, Lewis does recognize the interdependence of the two stories, despite his perception of â€Å"generic confusion† in the novel (239) the relation between the detective story and the tragedy expresses exactly what Brighton Hock is finally all about. It is a relation between modes of narrative discourse that reflects a relation between two kinds or levels of reality: a relation between incompatible worlds; between the moral world of right and wrong, to which Ida constantly and confidently appeals, and the theological world of good and evil inhabited by Pinkie and Rose.(244) However, we might add to these remarks that the relation between the two modes of narrative discourse can also be read as an inscription of the relationship between popular discourse and serious discourse. In the pure classical detective story that Todorov describes, the story of the crime becomes present in the text only through the story of the investigation; that is, the crime takes place outside the frame of the narrative and all its details are revealed only in the course of the investigation.The events leading to the crime make up a story that is seen only through its periodic intrusion by means of clues, or ciphers, into the story of the investigation which we read: we find out about the one story in the telling of the other. As Todorov figures it, this pattern reveals the two aspects that the Russian formalists identify as part of any story—fabula and sjuzhet—whe re the fabula is revealed only through the sjuzhet while yet providing the sjuzhet with the material of its own existence.However, as we have noted, to determine which of these two precedes the other is a task fraught with ambiguity, and this ambiguity is reflected in Brighton Rock's departures from the paradigm of the classical detective story. This ambiguity emerges in the novel's handling of the mechanics of the classical detective story's structure: Ida explicitly begins her pursuit at the place from which Hale disappeared (81) and then works to reconstruct the crime which, as even Pinkie realizes (86), is the standard investigative process.In a general sense, Ida traces over the previously laid path of Pinkie and his gang—an activity that is consistent with the structural dynamics of the classical detective story plot—and so figures the actions of the sjuzhet (the discourse) upon the material of the fabula (the story). As well, her retracing figures the act of wri ting that produces narrative as a rewriting of a prior narrative which is repressed in the later narrative although its existence is revealed in the later narrative—the narrative of the investigation—through the presence of clues which are the tangible signs marking the return of the repressed.However, in Brighton Rock Ida's pursuit of Pinkie intensifies the story of Pinkie's efforts to avoid capture. As Ida proceeds in her reading or events—explicitly linked to her reading of an occult text (â€Å"Fresuicilleye†)—she uncovers indications of Pinkie's story marked in the narrative's details, which in more orthodox detective fiction are formalized as clues: things such as Hale's dislike of Bass beer and his confession that he was â€Å"going to die† (18) arouse Ida's â€Å"instincts† so that she senses that â€Å"there is something odd† about Hale's death (31).Late; details that come out after his death, such as the fact that he used a false name (31), had bruises on his arms (79), and left a restaurant without eating despite telling Ida he was hungry (33), confirm Ida's suspicions that something is puzzling about the death while, at the same time, they reveal details of Pinkie's story. As the novel progresses, it becomes clear that Ida's investigation of Hale's death forces Pinkie's actions.Since the official investigators agree that Hale died of natural causes, they have closed the case (78-80), which means that it is only Ida whom Pinkie has to fear. In an odd way, then, Ida's search originates, explains, and validates all of Pinkie's actions from his courtship of Rose to his murder of Spicer to his attempt to arrange Rose's suicide: as Dallow accuses Ida late in the novel, â€Å"this is your doing. You made him marry her, you made him . . . † (236).To be sure, Pinkie fears that the police may ask questions about the man who left the card at Snow's, but, as we realize, they do not and will not reo pen their inquiry. In their place, though, is Ida. In this sense, the detective story plot determines the course of Pinkie's story; although, conversely, it is Pinkie's story that gives rise to the detective narrative. The two lines of action are entangled in each other with each standing as the origin of the other.Indeed, the question of origin is complicated further by the fact that the disturbance that excites the narrative of Brighton Rock into being—the murder of Hale—is considered an act of revenge: the initial action occurs in response to an earlier action—the murder of Kite—the story of which, though sporadically erupting into Pinkie's story (63, 218-19), lies in another narrative, another text; as the text explicitly remarks, â€Å"The whole origin of the thing was lost† (217).As a model of narrative mechanics, then, Brighton Rock, figures narrative's ability to perpetuate itself by inscribing within itself two separate narrative strands t hat generate and then feed on each other. Since Pinkie's story—the story of the crime—sparks Ida's story into life and since her investigation determines the content of Pinkie's story, each story can be seen as the origin of the other as each lies behind the other. Ida's investigation uncovers the contents of Pinkie's story, but his narrative also becomes the means by which Ida's story is discovered.To illustrate with just one example of how this works one can look at part 4, section 1 (99-120), where Pinkie and Spicer are at the race track. Although the storyline in the foreground involves Pinkie's betrayal of Spicer to Colleoni's men, one glimpses the other narrative line involving Ida. Spicer tells Pinkie about a woman who â€Å"backed Black Boy for a pony† (103). One then finds out that Black Boy won the race, and again Spicer mentions the woman who now has won so much money (104); the narrative goes on to report that Pinkie â€Å"heard a laugh, a female la ugh† which is attributed to the same woman (104-105).She is, of course, Ida, who bets on Hale's tip and so wins enough money to persist in the investigation. In this example one sees how the story of detection is revealed in the telling of Pinkie's story. Another way for us to see the relationship between the two narratives of Ida and Pinkie, of investigation and crime, is to think of either narrative strand as the repressed content of the other: each reveals its presence in intermittent clues that surface into the respective narrative.However, whichever way one chooses to view Brighton Rock again depends on one's point of view, but ultimately one is looking at the same thing. Greene reflects the indeterminate nature of narrative origins in his handling of the classical detective story's structure. As Brighton Rock stands, the story of the detection is interrupted by the story of the criminal, which reveals details of the crime; the two stories are presented in roughly alterna ting chapters occurring more or less along a shared timeline.The reader, then, gains knowledge of the circumstances of Hale's death from two sources, the chapters dealing with Ida and the chapters dealing with Pinkie. The two stories of the investigation and the crime become blurred in the novel as each begins to include the other. As if to underscore this blending of narrative, it is notable that the novel's first scene places Pinkie, Ida and Hale in the same room: murderer, detective, and victim have their stories begin at the same time in the same place. The novel figures, then, the indeterminate nature of narrative origin from its outset.Because Ida's investigation of events, metaphorically figured in her reading of an occult text, both reveals and determines the text she reads, we also see in Brighton Rock how the perceiving subject effects what it perceives, and in terms of reading the implications of this action are complex. On one level, reading a text actualizes that text f or the reader by inscribing it in the reader's consciousness where it previously did not exist. At the same time, the reader sees in the text what he or she is, in a sense, programmed to see through his or her experience of the â€Å"already-read†.This phenomenon lies behind the differing judgments on Brighton Rock: probable or improbable plot, proletarian novel or moral allegory, detective story or religious drama, light fiction or serious literature, entertainment or tragedy, and so on. However it is seen, the novel is the product of an interpretive act. Brighton Rock shows us both how these differences are generated and how they coexist within the textual field of the novel. The question of how texts are read is one of the issues at the heart of Brighton Rock.Perhaps more than in other detective stories, Brighton Rock foregrounds the reading process as a concern from the first page when we find Hale as Kolley Kibber following a route (itself prescribed by a text) through B righton in search of someone with a copy of The Daily Messenger in hand who can repeat a prepared text: â€Å"You are Mr. Kolley Kibber. I claim the Daily Messenger prize† (5). Language is, thus, explicitly figured as a code. The text stresses that the claim must be made â€Å"in the proper form of words† (5), and hence the possibility of arriving at a correct, univocal reading of a text, of fully understanding the code, is implied.However, since the challenge Hale receives ultimately results in his death, we see figured in Brighton Rock the inadequacy of such a simple method of reading. This possibility is confirmed in the larger investigation of reading that is enacted in the novel. As the detective, Ida is the reader of the fictions that Pinkie creates to explain Hale's, Spicer's, and, though it does not occur, Rose's deaths. In producing these fictions, Pinkie uses tangible signs, which are meant to mislead their reader. The cards he has Spicer lay along Hale's rou te are meant to stand as the visible traces of Hale's presence, as Hale's signature.Similarly, in preparing the story of Rose's suicide, Pinkie uses a note that Rose herself has written and insists that she â€Å"add a piece† to explain her death (231); for Rose, this involves â€Å"signing away more than her life† (227) because in committing suicide she commits a mortal sin which will, according to her belief, damn her. But in both instances, and particularly in the latter, the creation of a fiction is explicitly tied to the production of a written text, and in this way the act of detection that involves the reading of Pinkie's texts mirrors the activity of Greene's reader and of reading in general.Conclusion If Brighton Rock demonstrates the limitations of reading, it also insists upon the necessity of reading. Just as Chesterton described every detail within the urban landscape as a sign to be read by the detective in his or her search for truth, so is every detail within a detective story of potential significance to the reader's interpretation of the narrative. In Brighton Rock the experience of the world is figured in terms of reading; the world of Brighton is explicitly a world of text.Rose's father's face is â€Å"marked deeply with the hieroglyphics of pain and patience and suspicion† (142); â€Å"the edge of the sea is like a line of writing in whitewash: big sprawling letters† (152); and Ida, herself, is likened by the narrative to an enigmatic text that insists it be read: â€Å"she stood there like a wall at the end of an alley scrawled with the obscene chalk messages of an enemy† (196). In this context, reading becomes an unavoidable activity linked to power; those best able to read or even to offer convincing and authoritative readings are those who exercise power in this world.Both Ida and the police are confident in their interpretations of clues and events. The police, assigned the task of interpreting evide nce in order to determine whether or not a crime has been committed, produce their own reading of Hale's death. Their report presents a univocal interpretation of the details of the death and so preserves their power because in their eyes and in the eyes of the society the case is solved.The closing of the case thus maintains an impression of efficiency, which, in turn, justifies the authority conferred upon the police. As Edwin Muir wrote of Pinkie in a review of Brighton Rock, â€Å"he is an evil product of an evil environment, a living criticism of society, and on that plane genuine† (76). Muir's remarks could just as easily apply to Raven, who is said to be â€Å"made by hatred† (66). Indeed, because one of his obsessive boasts is â€Å"I'm educated† (15, 46), the social system that shapes Raven is severely criticized.In Brighton Rock there are hints of a repressed desire for goodness and peace in Pinkie that are seen in his emotional reactions to music, his recollection of his days in the church choir and his desire to be a priest, his faint stirring of tenderness for Rose and pity for Prewitt, and his sense of an â€Å"enormous emotion beating on him . . . the pressure of gigantic wings against the glass† as he drives Rose to what he assumes will be her death (242)—all of which indicate that Pinkie's evil arises out of the corruption of his innocence.In his case, the crippling effects of his environment destroy a natural tendency to goodness. The three â€Å"entertainments† that follow Brighton Rock, while not abandoning the social critique of the books from the thirties, become more obvious than Greene's text was in the interrogations of the thriller form and of the structures of authority—whether political, literary or textual—that exist within society. Bibliography Greene, Graham. Brighton Rock. 1938. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988._____________. Our Man in Havana. 1958. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 197 7. Lewis, R. W. B. â€Å"Graham Greene: The Religious Affair. † The Picaresque Saint: Representative Figures in Contemporary Fiction. Philadelphia and New York: Lipponcott, 1959. 220-74. McEwen, Neil. Graham Greene. Macmillan Modern Novelists. London: Macmillan, 1988. O'Donnell, Donat. â€Å"Graham Greene. † Chimera 5. 4 (Summer 1947): 18-30. Todorov, Tzvetan. The Poetics of Prose. 1971. Trans. Richard Howard. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977.

Many MNEs may want to start operations in some foreign country Essay

Establishment manner means that the MNE starts its operations from abrasion in the foreign state normally through a entirely owned subordinate where as in entry manner ; this can be accomplished by a subordinate or through partnership with a local party which involves shared ownership. In this survey the writers examine the consequence of same variables on both these picks available to a company. They do it through a series of hypotheses. The first hypothesis measures the positive consequence of greater institutional promotion on the pick that the company makes. Institutional promotion is defined in the survey as refering to alterations in formal establishments over a period of clip. It is argued that regulative forces are likely to be a large influence on a determination that an MNE makes with respect to its constitution or entry pick. Regulative forces or instead Regulative forces as described in the survey are non limited to Torahs and ordinances merely but besides include political and other societal factors. The writers conclude that institutional promotion has a positive consequence on the pick to set up a subordinate with shared ownership. The 2nd hypothesis postulated by the authors’ measures the chairing consequence of institutional promotion on the inclination of a technologically intense house to either travel for constitution manner or entry manner. It is argued that houses which are engineering intense should travel for constitution manner because their competitory advantages are embedded in their labour force accomplishments and organisational patterns so it is more efficient for them to get down from abrasion. They should engage and develop the local labour force. Furthermore in instance of a joint venture or portion ownership of the subordinate. protecting the rational rights can be an issue. Protection of such rights is dependent on the judicial system. In passage economic sciences where the bench is corrupt and rational belongings rights are non respected. an MNE would be loath to reassign its engineering. Therefore writers conclude that house with advanced proprietary engineering are likely to prefer establishment manner but degree of institutional promotion has a positive moderating consequence on such a house traveling for entry manner. The 3rd hypothesis measures the chairing consequence of institutional promotion on a multidomestic MNE to either travel for constitution of entry manner. Multidomestic houses are defined as those which pursue multidomestic scheme and want to set up a sustainable local market presence. For such MNEs geting a local company is a more attractive option because such acquisition can supply them with local trade names. market cognition. distribution channels and web relationships with the host country’s other concerns and authorities. How the restructuring and realignment of the acquired entity can be really ambitious. The houses in the host state are likely to be following a different paradigm. But on the other manus if an MNE goes for shared ownership or entry manner. it can carry through more without confronting these troubles. It is argues that a multidomestic MNE requires lesser control on the subordinate. If this is so so subordinates in the host state can hold considerable freedom and run on their ain to the full leveraging their local expertness. Hence it is concluded institutional promotion has a positive moderating consequence on a multidomestic MNE to travel for entry manner. Finally the writers have used an international study to garner the information to back up their findings. The study consists of a questionnaire with 33 unfastened and near complete inquiries. Furthermore the MNE’s latest constitution manner pick or entry manner pick has been taken as the dependant variable. Review This survey is no uncertainty a valuable plus for directors and pupils likewise in analyzing the behaviour of MNEs in doing their picks when it comes to Foreign Direct Investment but however it has a few defects and failings. But the biggest defect of this survey is the range. The writers have chiefly taken a sample of European MNEs. And the so called economic systems in passage are fundamentally east European states which were one time under the Fe drape. First we need to see the fact that Europeans MNEs may be really different from Nipponese or American MNEs and so forth. The constitution or entry manner pick for Nipponese houses may be dependent on or moderated by variables other than the 1s discussed here. Similarly an MNE whether European or Nipponese may make up one's mind to put in some state in Central Asia or North Africa or even South Asia. The market conditions in these states are really different from those of the passage economic systems discussed by the writers. This means that the findings in this survey are non universally applicable. Nevertheless it is a valuable add-on to our cognition sing MNE behaviour in doing Foreign Direct Investment determinations. But for any research worker seeking to confer with this survey. it is really of import to maintain the above mentioned restrictions in head.

A Historical Recording of a Fictitious Story Essay

One powerful factor in effective storytelling lies in the strong characterization of the figures in the story, and the novel, â€Å"Don Quixote† sustains this factor. In the beginning of the novel, Miguel de Cervantes warns his â€Å"idle readers† (Cervantes, page __) that he simply wants to relate the story of a stepson who lived a ridiculous but great life, saying thus: â€Å"My wish would be simply to present it to thee plain and unadorned, without any embellishment of preface or uncountable muster of customary sonnets, epigrams, and eulogies, such as are commonly put at the beginning of books. † (Cervantes, page__). The second part of the novel reveals a similar contention, this time uttered by Cide Hamete Benengeli in Chapter LXXIV. The reputed father of Don Quixote de La Mancha, Benengeli says, â€Å"For me alone Don Quixote was born and I for him. His was the power of action, mine of writing. † (Cervantes, page ___). By repeating these contentions, Miguel de Cervantes emphasizes and reiterates the idea that Don Quixote is a real character, a man who is not merely a product of a novelist’s imagination, but a tangible entity. Cervantes and his phantom figure, Benengeli, claim that they are merely recorders of Don Quixote’s deeds and misdeeds. Cervantes declares thus in his preface: â€Å"In belief of the good reception and honours that Your Excellency bestows on all sort of books, as prince so inclined to favor good arts, chiefly those who by their nobleness do not Customer’s last name 2 submit to the service and bribery of the vulgar, I have determined bringing to light The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of la Mancha. † (Cervantes, page__). Cervantes distances himself from the character by saying that he is merely a recorder of a person’s history, not a creator of a person so intriguingly chivalrous and comical at the same time. In doing so, Cervantes strengthens the character of Don Quixote, making him a mystery, and an enigma. Was he real, or was he imaginary? This intriguing question has kept readers all over the world and across generations to keep turning the pages of this humorous novel, and in this respect, Cervantes achieves his triumph in making the adventures of a tragic and comic knight-errant, a very engaging read. The two mentioned passages delineating one contention are significant in the reading of the novel as a whole. Promoting Don Quixote as a tangible entity, a real character, makes the novel more humorous, more effective, and more influential; the themes and sentiments imbibed in the story are therefore communicated more strongly. Cervantes provides a critical commentary on the Spanish lifestyle and morals at the time the novel was written, and one way to take a humorous novel seriously, is to project it as a palpable, realistic account of one person’s adventures and misadventures. This in itself is an ingenious literary style. Making Don Quixote an enigma and claiming that he is real, reflects the ridiculous and preposterous nature of the novel. Cervantes is ultimately making a literary statement: that in a world and in a time when chivalric ideals are appropriate, yet overrated, a society that is suspended between the grandiose aspects of chivalry and the humility of noble chivalric ideals must examine its principles very closely. If it fails to do, it may likewise fight windmills instead of giants, and therein lays a societal problem too unbelievably difficult to overcome. Works Cited Cervantes, M. Don Quixote. (Publication Information).

Evaluate the Financial Performance of US Financial Services Company to Essay

Evaluate the Financial Performance of US Financial Services Company to determine if they are able to invest in India - Essay Example To determine whether USFSC can invest in India one must analyze the recent financial performance of the company. The net income of USFSC in 2011 was $3.76 billion. The companys net income increased by 339% in comparison with the previous year. The company believes in giving back to its shareholders. In 2011 USFSC declared dividends of $665 million. The total assets of the company are $197.7 billion. In comparison with the previous year the total assets of USFSC have increased by 158%. The total loans and leases of the company amount to $138.9 billion. This total represents an increase of 205% in comparison with 2010. The debt to equity ratio of USFSC in 2011 was 1.12. This financial metric measures the amount of assets being provided by creditors for each dollar of assets being provided by stockholders (Garrison & Noreen, 2003). A ratio that calculates how leveraged the company is is the debt ratio. USFSC has a debt ratio of 0.53. Its debt ratio is relatively low which is favorable. Based on the analysis performed the company shows a lot of good signs. The profitability of the company has grow n over the past year due in part to its 205% growth on loans. USFSC has also grown its total assets. The company is in sound financial condition to support an expansion strategy, thus investing in India is

Special Event Master Plan Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3250 words

Special Event Master Plan - Assignment Example There are a lot of topics that pertain to events, and more emphasis is targeted at sports teams and their venues in the tourism industry (Getz, 2012, p.5). According to John Tribe, tourism is a field of study, rather than a discipline that draws on a number of different individual disciplines. The essay is an illustration of a special event involving a 3k walk for humans, and a swimming event right after the event. We will seek permission from the Street Events Closure Permit to hold the 3K walk run for humans at least 180 days before the event as required by the Ordinance Chapter 14-8. Also, we will require the Sound Amplification Permit or Outdoor Music Venue Permit since we aim at playing music at the central and starting point of the race. Lastly, we will also be required to seek for the Private Security licenses for the entity performing private security personnel expected to safeguard the event. Start from Columbus Park and run through the city streets. The major landmark cities to be followed will be decided upon effectively by the management team. The proposed route for the 3K walks will be differentiated according to the different groups of participants. The route will be decided upon after through consultation with the city council to determine the best paths for the 3K walks. Participants will be notified as early as possible on the routes decided upon through fliers, mails and even traditional mails delivered to their homes. Upon receipt, we will host a training and familiarization workshop to provide appropriate guidelines on the exact path to be followed. Participants will be required to familiarize with the route several days before the event. Access to the full path will be denied two days prior to the event to safeguard the course and ensure the participants are safe on the actual day of the event. All the necessary measures pertaining to safety of the course wil l be put in place as required. Specific rules and regulations to be followed

Service-Learning or AIDS WALK Experience Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Service-Learning or AIDS WALK Experience - Essay Example The community received students with a perspective of professionals who had a purpose. Young and old, youth and elderly, the community members, enjoyed seeing the students walk from one corner to another attending to the sick, advising, teaching and activating for a better health in the society. To the students, they had a chance to explore the community needs and wants, apply the class work to practical service to the community and employ their skills in service delivery. The participants arrived at the starting point on time and were issued with T-shirts with the writings, â€Å"AIDS is Real† and â€Å"Anyone can be a victim†. The T-shirts were issued to all the people who had already bought their tickets to participate in the walk. We all were required to pay $ 20 per person to acquire the ticket. It seemed that people had bought the tickets in plenty since the walk attracted more than two thousand people. Everyone seemed jovial to participate in the walk. This walk was aimed at sensitizing the public about AIDS and raise money to assist AIDS victims. The walk started at 10 am and lasted for four hours. We all walked through the city streets in unison and felt as though we were a community. The walk organizers provided all the participants with bottled water and energy drinks, in the course of the walk. This walk had incorporated nearly all the celebrities and other public figures. As we all walked and ran through the city, the national army band thrilled all passersby and the participants. The band played lovely songs that motivated people to continue walking. At the end of the walk, we all converged at the City Hall grounds where the partners and facilitators took us through ways on how we should treat AIDS victims and how we should relate to them. At the start of the AIDS Walk, the participants had formed opinions about the service, partners and personal abilities. Most of the participants thought that the service targeted a specific ethnic group and that it was a disease for gay people. Needless to say, other participants had a mistaken assumption that the partners should help reduce the prevalence of AIDS through the use of drugs alone. The participants also had the misconception that people should not interact with AIDS victims. This makes AIDS victims feel alienated from the society making it extremely difficult for them to open up and share AIDS opinions with the public. Moreover, the participants underestimated their abilities before the start of the walk. Walking 10 kilometers seemed impossible to many of the participants, but they were all surprised. In addition, most of the participants believed that they lacked personal attributes of relating well with AIDS victims. After the walk, all the assumptions held by the participants were proved wrong. Notably, we all gained personal skills on how to treat and relate with AIDS victims. In essence, the students who engage in service learning gain the practical skills and their contexts to provide back to the community the learned skills as services in response to any identified community concerns. The aim of Service learning is to attain equilibrium between service and goals of learning (seifer 1988). This objective fosters critical thinking and ensures there is a connection between theory and experience or practice. The facilitators and the partners noted that AIDS was not a disease for a particular ethnic group and that anyone can be a victim. They cleared the air by indicating that

Characteristics Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 1

Characteristics - Essay Example A number of nurses and doctors find patients’ culture as an obstacle to treatment. They believe that they, health practitioners, have been trained to know what is best for the patient and tradional beliefs amongst patients should not be encouraged. Science should be the basis on which medicine is supposed to be practiced. Practitioners also argue that the health of the patient should be given top priority, and not their cultural backgrounds or beliefs. (Toni Tripp-Reimer, Lisa Skemp Kelley) Another problem with cultural competency is that it degrades the cultural teachings to a mere technical subject, which the medical practitioners have to learn. Furthermore, the lack of diversity in the hospitals and the medical profession as a whole, leads to a lack of cultural competency care. Nurses or doctors might appear a little indifferent or unknowingly rude to a patient of a different ethnicity. The patients might notice this as a lack of sensitivity on the practitioner’s part and from there on, the communication bridge starts to break down. Also, the systems in the health care service are not up to the mark and do not meet the needs of people of different cultural backgrounds and ethnicities (Joseph R. Betancourt, Alexander R. Green and J. Emilio Carrillo. 2002). Consoling a family in grief and leading them through an adaptive process can be a challenging task for the medical practitioners, especially the nurses. This requires substantial knowledge of different cultural backgrounds, so that there is no breakdown of communication. A lack of respect for someone else’s cultural beliefs comes off as a great hindrance, and does not help the whole consoling process. If a nurse or doctor is familiar with the cultural beliefs or shows respect for people of different ethnicities, he/she can aid a family through the grieving process. But if there is a fine line drawn between two

Relationship between language,power and gender Essay

Relationship between language,power and gender - Essay Example Language, power and gender are highly related to each other. In order to understand the relationship between language, power and gender, let’s analyze their relationship with the other individually. Many scholars have commented on the relationship between language and the power people have on it. Writers have written many novels and stories on the issue the examples of which include Leslie Marmon Silko's short story Lullaby, Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of King Richard II and The Tempest, Frederick Douglass’s Learning to Read and Write, and Gloria Anzaldua’s How to Tame a Wild Tongue. All of these works convey the same message that language and power are interrelated to each other and one cannot survive without the other.Patel states in his article that â€Å"the way a person speaks or writes determines that person's power in the world.† Elaborating on this will give the whole idea how easy it is to define the social status of an individual while consi dering the language with which he defines himself.An analysis of languages spoken in different regions in the world shows that there are some languages which are recognized and spoken internationally, while there are other which are only spoken within a limited are like within a country. Even inside a country,there are many forms of that one language by which that country is known.This is a sad truth that for a country to progress in this competitive world and to eventually come in power,it is important to get acknowledged with the internationally known languages so as to facilitate the trade and business. Just getting acknowledged is not sufficient but to inculcate that language in the educational curricula is vital to raise the nation with an intense knowledge of that language so that the people of the country can read, write and speak that foreign language just like they easily go with their own mother tongue. This brings power. The relationship between power and gender raises qu estions like whether one gender is given advantage over the other so that one gendered is empowered and the other is left discriminated. The gender differences in many countries makes power stay stuck to only one gender like men are politically preferred to women. Similarly, there are gender discriminations at occupational workplaces due to which men are given chances to get better jobs and women are told to stay at home in front of the stove all day. â€Å"Although women have made gains in the workplace, with more women working than in the past and women possessing approximately a third of all management positions† (Colwill, as cited in Carli, 1999). Male children are also preferred to get higher education which later on offers them high paying jobs within and across the border. This reduces power for the female gender. The difference in social power between the two genders has given rise to the feminist theories which fought for the liberation of women so that they come out of their houses and stand on equal status as men to enjoy the different luxuries of life. Beeching (2004) affirms that the relationship between language and gender gives rise to man linguistic issues. According to her, â€Å"Men's and Women's Talk have arguably been demonstrated to show differences at the phonetic, syntactic, lexical and discourse levels.† Gender socialization affects the overall structure and use of a language. Language has defined the changing responsibilities and roles of the men and women in different walks of life, nationally and internationally. Simkins-Bullock and Wildman (1991, p. 149) have studied in their research the differences in gender in the use of a language and have come to the conclusion that there is much inconsistency among the scholars in agreeing whether or not the two genders use the same language differently. They state that scholars suggest that there are several ways in which the males and females make use of a language but other as pects should also be considered besides gender in

Paraphrasing Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words - 2

Paraphrasing - Assignment Example (Audubon 1990, pg. 17) Research has shown that out of the one thousand lives lost as a result of bicycle accidents three quarters results from head injuries and half of these deaths affect school children. Another study also indicated the use of helmets reduces chances of head injury by approximately 85% through provision of a cushion to head as well as the absorption of shock (Unused life savers Consumer Report 1990, pg. 348). Matisse in the most excellent artist among the contemporary artists in making realistic scenarios to his viewers; an example of his work is the Casbah Gate which is mostly known to many of his fans as the Bab el Aassa. It exhibits a feeling of the breeze as essential to well-being and a smell of oranges as crucial to constant life. This piece of work is strategically located on a wall near the Sultan’s palace. The painting on the wall is made by rough pieces of ivory to form an aqua blue together with a rose that is surrounded by a gray outline to give the viewers a feeling of tangier afternoon as well as an artful occurrence of the bowaab which faces the entry of the Gate (Plagens1990, pg. 50) Despite the fact that Sear Towers is considered as the greatest achievement in the Skyscraping Engineering dimension, engineers as well as architects are still enthusiastic to develop the tallest buildings in the world. This has raised concerns on the maximum height in which buildings can be erected. A building twice as high as the Sear towers has been designed by the famous Structural Engineer William and has a dimension of half a mile in height. Research by Sobei depicts that the contemporary technology can capacitate the construction of a five hundred story tower (Bachman 1990, pg.

Affirmative Action Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Affirmative Action - Essay Example Because of this, the execution debate of affirmative action has raged based on this policy principle on the people of America. America is against affirmative action as it is a form of reverse discrimination and goes against the very same principles for which it fights, meaning that, since affirmative action was created to fight for the rights of the people whose rights were violated, it continues to run and be applied, as well as implemented in modern times. Based on modern information on affirmative action, the threshold of implementing and meeting the margin between discrimination and integration has been crossed meaning that there is more integration and people who were once discriminated against now have equal opportunities. Implementation of affirmative action in modern times, therefore, is an act of discriminating against the people who discriminated against those who are now conducting the discrimination. As such, the argument is that it creates an unfair advantage for certain groups over others, which translates to it being a discriminatory action against certain groups, creating grounds for it to b e abolished and even done away with permanently. In addition, based on the same argument, the action or policy is a failure in terms of creating equal opportunities in the American society considering it only serves to counteract the gains made over many years in terms of protecting minority groups (Marklein). This can be seen in cases where minorities are discriminated where they are recognized by other members of society as having credible success as it is based on policies that go against the rest of the society by giving unfair advantages. Another argument against the same policy is based on the American constitution, where all individuals are subject to equal protection, which would then contradict the same policy of affirmative action. This is because the constitution calls for the protection of the rights of all Americans, which then

Islam and the Challenge of Democracy Essay Example for Free

Islam and the Challenge of Democracy Essay Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl is the most prolific of the Islamic thinkers of today’s world. He is a great Islamic jurist and scholar, and is now a Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law giving the students knowledge of Islamic law, Immigration, Human Rights, International and National Security Law. His Islam and the Challenge to Democracy is the quest to find out numerous questions and varied answers in establishing the relation between the principles so enshrined in Democracy and Islamic political and religious tenants. To propound the relationship between the Islam and democracy is not a straightforward as it involves the deep and thorough understanding of the religious and political structures of the Islamic world and Democracy in its entity. Dr Khaled says that issue of democracy in the Islamic world of today is being hotly debated and there are both pro and anti versions to this issue that compete with each other and the biggest challenge before the advocators is to promote the vision of social justice and faith. The very first section only of his most profile book Islam and the Challenge of Democracy straight forwardly says that he does not believe as what other Muslim advocators say that Islam has given birth to Democracy but various elements of Democracy are very well present in the Islam and we can say that Islam too supports Democracy. In this endeavor, he defied the view of radical Islamists as well as hardened Islamophobes who say that as God is sovereign master of whole Universe, therefore the principles of Democracy do not hold true for the Islamic world. El Fadl poises that there is no doubt of the fact that the God is the sovereign power in the Universe yet this is God who has bestowed upon the humans, the power to envisage the right to form rules to govern themselves in the form of deputies or khulafa. In-fact Islam also believes in a form of government, that gives power to the people, transparency in the decision making through shura’ and there is a toleration for any disagreements and disputes arising out of any rule and rules are accountable to his subjects for any actions. El Fadl believes in the formulation of the basic ethical values, and rights for all human beings on this Earth. He focuses that Islam should formulate the laws through ijtihad on which shari‘ah doesn’t have anything to say. He emphasized on the importance of formulating the maslaha or the ‘public good’ and ahkam al-shari‘ah or ‘expediency laws’ to envisage new thought process to develop the understanding of giving equal rights to every one. He admits that any interpretation of Islamic tenets, which has been construed by Islamic religious heads or Islamic religious leaders cannot be held as mere will of the divine power or God. He vehemently opposes the formation of the Islamic state that has all the rights to form the Shari’ah, because he is fully aware of the fact that no human being can interpret the will of the God or divine power. If this is done, it will lead to misunderstanding or very limited understanding of the link or relation between the Islam and will of God and this in turn would mean trying to become equal to God and that’s the biggest sin. This will further lead to authoritative and oppressive state. He said that although Muslim jurists defined and formulated number of political systems, yet there is nothing specific mentioned in Qur’an about any form that Government wishes to take. But Qur’an does recognize social and political values which form the basis in an arena of Muslim politics. Three values that are so enshrined in the Islamic testament: â€Å"Are: pursuing justice through social cooperation and mutual assistance (Qur’an 49:13; 11:119); establishing a non-autocratic, consultative method of governance; and institutionalizing mercy and compassion in social interactions (6:12, 54; 21:107; 27:77; 29:51; 45. 20)†. (El Fadl, Democracy and Divine Sovereignty, 2) Overall Muslims should form the government that would help in endorsing these values. As he said, â€Å"Qur’an says that God has bestowed all human beings a divine power by making them viceroys of God on this earth: He says, â€Å"Remember, when your Lord said to the angels: ‘I have to place a vicegerent on earth,’ they said: ‘Will you place one there who will create disorder and shed blood, while we intone Your litanies and sanctify Your name? ’ And God said: ‘I know what you do not know’† (2:30). (El Fadl, The Case for Democracy, 3) Institutionally it can be pointed out that the ulama, or Jurists can act as interpreters of the words of God and define what is moral and what acts are immoral for the humans. Every word of them is the voice of the God. But the law of the state demands that no religion can be imposed on the working of the state because laws of the state have been formulated by the humans according to their own whims and state itself. And therefore in his own words, â€Å"Democracy is an appropriate system for Islam because it both expresses the special worth of human beings—the status of vicegerency—and at the same time deprives the state of any pretense of divinity by locating ultimate authority in the hands of the people rather than the ‘ulama†. (El Fadl, Shari‘ah and the Democratic State, 20) Finally he says that educators try to enthuse in the soul of the people the moral values of Qu’ran and induce the society to turn towards will of God. But in this world of today, if a person is morally strong but cannot imbibe by full majesty of God but still believes in the fundamental rights of individuals, still have to be answerable to the will of God. It’s not just the mirage of the El Fadl’s views but also the vision of the several scholars on the most crucial and complex subject, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. The second section of the book consists of short responses to El Fadl’s essay by several scholars. Nader A. Hashemi says that the most prominent aspect to El Fadl is his belief that Democracy can be possible in Islamic countries, with this he proved false, the wildly held belief that Islam is not compatible to democracy. He further said that this idea has gained immense popularity after September 11. He states that biggest challenge in front of the Islamic nations is the choice that they have to make between the modernization and fanaticism and the future of the Middle East all depends on which of them will go for a longer period. John Esposito espoused that El Fadl indicates complex and multiple manner by which Qur’an can be interpreted by the religious fundamentalists, fanatics and politicians to fulfill their various social and political motives. Jeremy Waldron appreciates El Fadl’s study of the theory of the Islamic democracy. Jeremy says that El Fadl conceptualized in the most articulate way the issue of the Islamic tradition and the way in which he poises about the politics and the rule of law in the milieu of the medieval age and how these thoughts were so prevalent in the early modern thought in the Christian era. Also, how the moral and ethical values in the context of good governance had to struggle to make its place in front of scriptural authority and theocratic rule. The most enduring thing was that these ideas not only grew out of the abased environment but also actually kept on presenting itself by religious ideas and ecclesiastical practices. Muqtedar Khan talks about the â€Å"Pact of Medina†, which was signed between the Prophet and Jews and the pagans of the town. This pact he said could be utilized to give the Islamic world the model for democracy and pluralism. In this pact, all the parties were guaranteed equal rights and equal responsibilities. Echoing El Fadl, he pinpointed that Islam should be made a symbol of ethical values and moral principles and should solve all the problems from the new outlook and new democratic perspective. But Saba Mahmood criticized Fadl on the point of liberalization. She says that very concept of liberalization is full of contradictions and the limitations that follow. She further says that he focused more on rights of individuals than on community as a whole. El Fadl also ignored the human rights violations that follow liberalization, which are most popular in the most liberalized states like United States of America. Even Kevin Reinhart revokes same voice as Saba Mahmood by saying that El Fadl ignored the vital point of what the Western nations learned from their liberalized approach in their relations with the other countries including Islamic nations. The whole liberalized approach depends on polices of Westernized nations and the military interventions of the USA in Islamic countries jeopardized whole concept of democracy and liberalization. William Quandt too said that the absence of democracy in the Islamic countries do not lie in their religion perspective but the problem lies in the presence of monarchical or dictatorial regimes in these countries, which partially or all are backed by the Western powers. In William Quandt views lie the whole thrust of the problem in the Islamic countries. The requirement is the political and structural changes in the Islamic world that would bring about social and economic upliftment from the vision of democracy, which El Fadl, all the intellectuals and scholars agree won’t be welcomed by either the ruling regime or the Western allies. All in all, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy is the most thought provoking book ready to be explored and pondered in every religious and political arena of the Islamic world. WORKS CITED El Fadl, Abou Khaled. Islam and the Challenge of Democracy: Can individual rights and popular sovereignty take root in faith? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Black Women’s Feminism and Literature Essay Example for Free

Black Women’s Feminism and Literature Essay Black Women, the term often denotes the black skinned people, especially those who are based on the African region. Though various famous writers who shed their words as bloods and fought against the injustice that where happening against the black people, Maya Angelou was one remarkable person. She concentrated more towards the women sector, as she is a more sensitive and phenomenal woman by herself. One innate quality of her is that she is always proud to see her as a woman. Most of her literary works focus towards bringing revolution in the society, in particular for women. Black women faced lots of troubles due to inequality and racial discrimination and to overcome all these were formed the National Black Feminism Organisation (NBFO). All women from this organisation fought for achieving equality and power for the blacks. Several social, political and feminist movements where held to support the black women. This seriousness of problem was not only because of inequality faced by the black women. They were also cheaply thrust to sexism by the men of other class. It is a undoubted fact that writers are the most expressive and understanding people more than others, and they have a different logical perspective towards anything they perceive. That is why writers, especially female writers focus more towards the welfare of women and it is absolutely undeniable that women deserve all these special benefits and considerations. I, out of personal experience, owe my fullest respect to the women I personally lived my life with. It is none other than my precious mother. I would say women scarify the best way to offer the best things for others. She is the role model in my life and she has moulded me in a very adorable way and what I am today is just what she blessed me with. I always bow my head to the precious gift god gave me. Women are always the best examples in various fields, and if no women, there is nothing pleasant in the world. African American Women, though has faced lot of struggles and obstacles, have managed to successfully overcome all of them. Today, in this 21st century, we can see various women from the Black history to be successful shining in all fields. Our dearest writer Maya Angelou is one such person, and the list may extend up to Daisy Bates, who is a revolutionary journalist and an active member of civil rights. Maya has sculpted the pain of the black women in each of her works and this has also been a reason for the revolution. It will definitely not be hype when we say black women have contributed a lot to the global culture. One main reason for this could be their resistance and withstanding capacity towards all the obstacles and humiliation they happened to come across. They used their power wisely in overcoming all this struggles. If they would have felt the troubles a big burden for them, then they would definitely have gone invisible to all of them. But, they stood up sturdy against all these racism and sexism issues. They made use of their strengths and powers in a constructive way by initiating various activist movements and fighting for the law. They proved that they deserve the equal rights and power and they are no way lesser than other society women. Days when women thought themselves as victims have gone beyond the mountains and now women overcome the struggles by exhibiting their talents and traits. Participation of women in all fields is drastically increasing and now there is no field you can observe that women cannot be a part of it. Women prove that they are always the winners, be it any discipline. References http://www. poemhunter. com/poem/phenomenal-woman/ http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Black_feminism http://womenshistory. about. com/od/africanamerican/a/black_women. htm

Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant

Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant The Relation between Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Introduction ‘Every action and choice is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. (Aristotle: 1094a1-3). Philosophy has always been concerned with trying to determine why we do the actions we do: what are we hoping to achieve by performing certain actions? The above quote is Aristotles opening sentence in the Nicomachean ethics, but how are we actually meant to achieve this good that we are aiming for? Many people in the world would be happy to support the claim that the good is achieved by being virtuous but what exactly does this entail? For Aristotle, ‘moral excellence comes about as a result of habit (Aristotle: 1103a16-17) and ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2). It then seems we are safe to claim that the good, (â€Å"moral excellence†), corresponds with happiness, but was he right? And does this happiness include pleasure, or is it excluded? Are virtue and pleasure synonymous? Can they even exist harmoniously at all? Throughout the history of thought, philosophers have attempted to discern that element of human nature that can be most aptly described as the action of taking pleasure in doing certain actions, and in the consequences that arise from any given action. The role of virtue in this pleasure process has been assessed and criticised for hundreds of years; does being virtuous give us pleasure, or does pleasure distract us from doing virtuous things? Is happiness the key to a moral life? My aim in this essay is to address these questions, and related questions, according to the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle. In doing so, I aim to discover what the relation between virtue and pleasure really is, according to these two philosophers. My aim is to discover what the role is of both virtue and pleasure, and the connection between them, in the works of both philosophers, and try to establish where the two philosophies align, and where they are incompatible. At first, it seems as though both philosophers are wholly incompatible in their views of where our morality, our motivation to strive for the good, comes from. Even how the two define what the good is seems to differ too much to offer any similarities. As I briefly mentioned in my opening paragraph, for Aristotle, the purpose of human life is the good, and ‘the highest of all goods achievable by action is happiness. And [many] identify living well and faring well with being happy (Aristotle: 1095a16-19). For Kant however, the question of morality is wrapped up in the concept of â€Å"duty† ‘he does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth (Kant 1997: 4:398). In this essay I will explain exactly what both meant, and critically assess their ideas, with the ultimate goal of somehow reconciling the two seemingly opposing viewpoints. In the process of doing this I will first give an explanation of the foundations of these views what part of each philosophers lifes work these ideas about morality have arisen from. Background When examining any philosophical theory I think it is of vital importance to understand how those particular ideas have been formed what part of the writers thought and theories have these ideas originated from? In this section, I will give a brief overview of whereabouts in their respective works do Kant and Aristotle expound their views on morality, in reference to both pleasure and virtue. Aristotles Nicomachean ethics is part of his practical philosophy (along with his Eudemian ethics), and is primarily a search for what the ultimate goal of human life is. Aristotle was a student of Plato, and as such was likely to have been influenced by his philosophy. It is nothing new to philosophy to be preoccupied with morality. Arguably Platos greatest work, The Republic is fundamentally an inquiry into morality and justice, and what sort of society would be best for cultivating â€Å"the moral man†. In book II of The Republic, Plato tells a story of the mythical ring of Gyges, which is a ring that renders the wearer invisible. Glaucon (the teller of this story in the dialogue) claims that no man, no matter how virtuous or just he is, could resist acting immorally if there was no danger of punishment (Plato: 359c-360c). Glaucon does not believe that any man who had no consequences to face would be moral his claim is that we are moral because society forces us to be so, through fear of being reprimanded. In this case, morality becomes a social construct, and has nothing to do with the singular man who would dismiss moral behaviour in an instant if he believed he could avoid castigation. Aristotles ethics do not follow this way of reasoning, he believes that man can be moral within himself, and also that a man is not virtuous simply by performing virtuous actions, ‘his action must [also] proceed from a firm and unchangeable character (Aristotle: 1105a32-33). Aristotle is often misquoted about what he really meant, due to a mistranslation of the original Greek. Aristotle describes the goal of human life as eudaimonia, which is oft translated as happiness. However, the original meaning of this word is something more akin to being ‘blessed as regards ones own spirit (Pakaluk 2005: 47), or more literally, human flourishing. Pakaluk (2005) goes on to explain the fundamental differences between our commonplace definition of happiness and how we must understand it as a translation of eudaimonia. Most importantly we must understand that Aristotles happiness is not a hedonistic happiness where ‘pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper end of act ion (OED 1989). Eudaimonia is a stable, lasting condition, one that does not fluctuate according to day-to-day events it is an ultimate goal rather than a temporary one. It is also objectively universal it is not a subjective condition based upon the wants of each individual it is a state of being, not a mood or inclination, which is similar for all human beings and is characterised as living well ‘the happy man lives well and fares well (Aristotle: 1098b20). Aristotles definition of virtue is also similarly misunderstood. The original Greek is arete which means ‘any sort of excellence or distinctive power (Pakaluk 2005: 5). Thus being a virtuous person means possessing a certain sort of excellence (of character) which leads us to act virtuously. This form of morality bases the value of any action on the character of the agent an agent must be ‘a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or non-actions (Pojman 2002: 160). We cannot take morality from the actions in themselves, because virtue can be demonstrated through the conscious omission of any certain action morality must instead be based upon the agent. For Kant, his views of how pleasure can affect the goodness, or virtue, of any action can be found most clearly in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The Groundwork (1786) comes between the two different versions of the Critique of Pure Reason that were published (1781 and 1787), and there is certainly a crossover of concepts, with Kant utilising some of the arguments of the Critique in the Groundwork. Namely, his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, respectively, the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us. This distinction between the true essence of things, and their appearances provides us with ‘two standpoints from which [man] can regard himself and cognize laws for all of his actions (Kant 1987: 4:452). The aim of the Groundwork is to ‘proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle (Kant 1997: 4:392). In other words, Kant wants to start from the common perception that every action has some sort of moral value and discover what the underlying principle of morality is, that causes this presupposition. This supreme principle that we uncover must be a synthetic a priori one we must be able to deduce it from what we already know, because we are trying to discern how we ought to be from the evidence of how we are. The Groundwork is the quest to discover what this principle is. According to Kant a virtuous person is someone who performs the right actions for the right reasons (which seems to be similar with Aristotles view the action itself does not hold any value the value instead lies within the agents intent). A person who acts thus demonstrates a good will, which is the only thing to which we attribute total merit ‘It is impossible to think of anything that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Kant 1997: 4:393). This good will possesses worth completely independently of any circumstances, both the means and the ends are good. ‘Even if this will should yet achieve nothing, then [it is still] something that has it full worth in itself In other words, the good will does not need to achieve its end in order to be good, merely the attempt is so. Kant then introduces the concept of duty in order to explain how we are able to manifest the good will in our actions. The concept of duty ‘contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making in unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly (Kant 1997: 4:397). If we do our duty from duty (i.e. for its own sake, because it is the right thing to do, rather than due to some other inclination or motivating desire) then we are doing the right actions for the right reasons we are being virtuous. Kant uses formulations of his categorical imperative in order to demonstrate how we can determine what our duty is, although I will not go into them in this chapter. Kant shows that any system used to deduce our duty must be categorical, and not hypothetical, because a hypothetical imperative tells you how to achieve a certain end if you will x, then you must also will y in order to be able to achieve x. A hypothetical imperative is conditional, it depends on something else. A categorical imperative cannot be so it tells us what we ought to do unconditionally, not on the condition of something else. Kant uses his formulations of the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate when we can say an act is done from duty or not. If an act is done from duty for dutys sake, then it is a virtuous action, if not, then it is not, even if the action is not necessarily â€Å"bad†. Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle Virtue can be taken to have several different meanings; the dictionary definition is ‘conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality; voluntary observance of the recognized moral laws or standards of right conduct; abstention on moral grounds from any form of wrong-doing or vice (OED 1989). For Aristotle the idea of virtue is the mean between two vices, stray but a little from the middle, and you are no longer being wholly virtuous. This Aristotelian view of virtue is often seen as in direct opposition to the Kantian view of virtue that the virtuous man is the man who acts solely from the motivation of wanting to do his duty, without enjoying the act at all. I will explain in full whether this common view of Kantian ethics is correct in the following chapter, and in this chapter I will explain what I mean by my definition of Aristotelian virtue, and exactly what that signifies in relation to pleasure. Aristotles ethics are usually defined as virtue ethics they are agent centred, and depend (like Kant) not on the act that is done, but instead on what sort of person we need to be, what sort of character we need to have, in order to be able to commit virtuous acts. Aristotle starts off the Nicomachean ethics by trying to discern what the goal of human life is, and in book one manages to come up with what standards he thinks this goal must adhere to what are the characteristics this ultimate goal must have in order to be classed as such? Aristotle states that ‘we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be: for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else (Aristotle: 1097a34-1097b1). Our ultimate goal, the highest good, must be desired for itself only, and not as a means to something else. Aristotle refers to this ultimate goal of human life as eudaimonia, but what does this really mean? Does eudaimonia equate to hedonistic pleasure? Accordingly to Aristotle, eudaimonia is not synonymous with pleasure, he states that ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2), so happiness is the achievement of pure excellence, or of complete virtuousness. Human flourishing is what we achieve when we successfully fulfil the human function when we excel at what it is that makes us distinctly human. This means, that in order to understand this ‘human flourishing which is the ultimate goal of human life, we also need to understand the function of human beings ‘Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. (Aristotle: 1097b22-25). Aristotle believed that everything in the world has an â€Å"ergon†, a function, which is ‘that for the sake of which it exists; therefore the achieving of this work, or, more precisely, its doing so well, is its good; but only a good thing of a kind achieves its function well (Pakaluk 2005: 75). For example, the function of a knife is to cut things, so a good knife must be able to cut things well, therefore a good knife must be sharp. If there is to be a human function, then it will be what makes us essentially human what it is that separates us from everything el se in the world the thing that we are best capable of. But what makes Aristotle believe that humans necessarily have to have a function? Aristotle claims that it is merely common sense that man should have a function, because everything else in the world does ‘Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and man has none? Is he naturally functionless? (Aristotle: 1097b29-30). It seems clear that man must have a function just as any other thing does. So what is this function? If something only achieves its function well if it possesses the certain virtues that make it a good thing of its kind (like sharpness for the knife) then the human function must be something that is best achieved by humans more than anything else in the world. Or even, it may be something that is only achievable by human beings. ‘A virtue is a trait that makes a thing of a certain kind good and in view of which we call a thing of that kind â€Å"good†. (Pakaluk 2005: 75). In this way, Aristotles function argument follows on to an investigation into what qualities human beings possess, what virtues they possess in their character, that makes them distinctively human. In order to find out what the human function is, we need to find something that is distinctive to humans. It cannot be merely living, as that is shared with even plants, and it cannot be perception, because although that rules out plants, it still includes the animal kingdom. Instead the human function must be ‘an active life of the element that has a rational principle (Aristotle: 1098a3-4). In other words the human function, that element of human beings which is characteristic to us alone, is our capability to reason; our rationality. Of course, this definition of the human function as rationality causes some problems in the case of people who have diminished rationality what does this mean for them? Take, for example, the mentally handicapped who have reduced capacities of reason through no fault of their own are they really less capable of living fulfilling and flourishing lives than â€Å"normal† people? Are they â€Å"less good†? It seems as though, according to this argument, we are required to count them as worth less. However, I will not dwell on this problem, as I am more concerned with what this idea of a function implies for the role of pleasure in Aristotles ethics. What then, does it mean that the human function is our capacity to reason? The human function is what we must achieve excellence in, in order to be â€Å"good† (just as the knife must achieve excellence in its function of sharpness, in order to be a good knife). This means that morality, and consequently virtue, are intrinsically linked to the human function, to our rationality it is our reason that allows us to achieve virtue. We must use our reason in order to discern what is virtuous. Our function of rationality is what allows us to achieve our excellence, to achieve our virtue. So how does our reason allow us to achieve our virtue? It allows us to choose whatever course of action we feel would allow us best to achieve our happiness, our telos (ultimate goal). Hursthouse (1991) reads Aristotle as meaning that an action is regarded as â€Å"right† because it is what a virtuous person would choose to do, but is it not the other way round? Does a virtuous person not choose to do certain acts because they are good? This problem is obviously reminiscent of Euthyphros dilemma from the platonic dialogue of the same name is a certain act considered good because God says it is so, or does God say it is so because it is good. For Aristotle the ability to choose the morally right action in any situation is an ability to follow the moral mean ‘that moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense is it so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency (Aristotle: 1109a1-3). So for example, the virtue of bravery is the mean between cowardice and rashness. Aristotle also states that virtue is dependent on our character if we have the right character we will be predisposed to commit actions of the right sort. ‘Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit states arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind (Aristotle: 1103b20-22). Therefore, if we habitually perform the right sort of action, then we will generate the right sort of character, thus enabling us to almost automatically choose the correct action, which sits in the middle of this scale between virtue and vice. Our eudaimonia is more and m ore fulfilled by each instance in which our character â€Å"automatically† chooses the virtuous action. Does this idea of virtue as the mean between two vices imply that pleasure is then a vice, being the vice at one end of the scale of the virtue of moderation, whilst the other end is despair? A virtue can be best described as the course of action that allows us to achieve our eudaimonia. So is pleasure more suited to this task than despair (if we take despair to be the other end of the scale)? Would the mean on the scale in actuality lie closer to the end of pleasure than the other? Is this a purely arithmetical mean, the exact midpoint between two extremes, or is it something more flexible? Just as everyone requires different amounts of food in their everyday life (such that everyones â€Å"mean† between scarcity and gluttony differs), would it not make sense that the mean of enjoyment is different for everyone as well? Such that enjoyment of life, whilst it does not mean a slavish commitment to complete hedonistic pleasure, could mean that pleasure does play an important rol e in our lives. I believe that Aristotle would agree with me here, since he states that ‘no one nature or state is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue the same pleasure (Aristotle: 1153b29-30). In other words, we do not all desire the same pleasures to the same degree, instead we pursue only those pleasures which are best suited to helping each of us, as an individual, to achieve our eudaimonia. We can therefore agree with Shermans reading of Aristotle, that ‘moral habituation is the cultivation of fine (or noble) pleasures and pains (Sherman 1989: 190). In this way, virtuousness does not mean a complete abandonment of all pleasure, but instead tells us that we should be interested in only those pleasures which are â€Å"worthy† of the rational mind. In some ways this bears similarity with Mills recalculation of Benthams utilitarianism that some pleasures (of the intellect) are worth more in the hedonic calculus than mere physical pleasures (Mill 2001). However, appreciation of the right pleasures is a taught skill also. By that I mean one of habit, such as virtue is according to Aristotle, and as such ‘we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained in the things that we ought (Aristotle: 1104b11-13). What is slightly problematic is that Aristotle gives two seemingly wholly different accounts of what pleasure is. In Book II he states that ‘it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things (Aristotle: 1104b10), by this meaning that a love of pleasure for itself will lead us to ignore the virtuous path and live a life of pure hedonism, thus failing to achieve our telos of eudaimonia. In Book VII he states that ‘the view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket (Aristotle: 1153a17-18). This view is nonsensical, and would lead us to having to avoiding almost every type of activity. Some pleasures are bad, but this does not necessarily make all pleasures bad. However, whilst these two accounts do differ, there is a common theme between them, which is that pleasure is not necessarily bad, and can exist in harmony with virtue. However, we need to qualify exactly what pleasures we mean here, as not all pleasure can be called good. Annas (1980) interprets Aristotle as believing that pleasure is only good when done by the virtuousness man, because the habit of his character will lead him to only choose to act on those pleasures which are virtuous ‘it is right for the good man to seek pleasure; pleasure will point him in the right direction. (Annas 1980: 286). Whereas the man who is immoral in habit will only persue those pleasures which ‘confirm the deplorable tendencies of [him], since it will strengthen his habits of wickedness and weakness (Annas 1980: 286-7). Here, the important point is not that we need to avoid pleasure, but that we need to be sure that we are pursuing the right kind of pleasure before we act upon it the pl easure of the virtuous man, not the deplorable man. The obvious problem with this interpretation is that Annas at first glance seems to be claiming that only a good person can access pleasure in a good way. Where does this leave the immoral man who wishes to reform his character? Is there no possibility that he will be able to choose those pleasures that are good for his character? Is this what Aristotle is really saying when he claims that virtue is a matter of habit, of character? ‘If the things [the good man] finds tiresome seem pleasant to someone, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this condition. (Aristotle: 1176a19-22). This quote for one certainly seems to be suggesting that the virtuous man will be able to steer clear of immoral pleasures, whilst the immoral man will not. Aristotle emphasizes several times the fact that his ethics is based upon repeated behaviour, on habit, and ‘a short time [or virtuousness], does not make a man blessed or happy (Aristotle: 1098a18-19). What this means is that a period of immorality in a mans life does not necessarily preclude him from ever achieving his eudaimonia, and similarly, a brief period of virtuousness does not make a man wholly virtuous. Aristotles ethics is a system of right and wrong that demonstrates itself through habit, and habits can change, although it may be hard to dispose of bad habits, of immoral habits, because ‘it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion [for immoral pleasures] (Aristotle:1105a2-3). This does not mean that it is impossible, indeed it must be possible to change our character, otherwise what we are taught in our youth would be how we remain for life, meaning that whether we become a good or a bad person depends mor e on our teachers, rather than any attempt at morality by ourselves. We cannot be deprived of a chance at our eudaimonia just because we fail to receive the right training of character in our youth. It must be possible to reform and for the immoral man to pursue good pleasure or how else can he become a man who chooses only good pleasures out of habit? Some might claim that this seems unfair. If moral virtue is merely an act brought about by habit, then it is far easier for the good man to be virtuous that it is for the bad man to be so so where is the incentive for the bad man to change his ways and attempt to cultivate the right sort of character in order to be good by habit? But ‘even the good is better when it is harder (Aristotle: 1105a10), and the bad man will be rewarded if he perseveres. If a bad man successfully changes his character to that of the virtuous man, then he is satisfying the human function, the human ergon, and he will be able to achieve the ultimate telos for human beings eudaimonia his human flourishing. The incentive for the bad man to change his ways, no matter how difficult it may be, is that he will achieve the ultimate goal of complete happiness. In this way does the right sort of pleasure, lead first to the cultivation of a habit of character of complete excellence or virtue, which in turn then leads to ultimate happiness. However, as Hutchinson (1986) points out, there is a problem with this idea that, ultimately, restraint over which pleasures we decide to pursue is how we describe virtue. If ‘discipline produces virtue and, when misguided, defect of character, by means of pleasure and pain, the virtues (and vices) are dispositions for enjoying and disliking things (Hutchinson 1986: 79). Hutchinson goes on to state that this cannot be so, because children are rewarded in the study of arithmetic through pleasure and pain. So then ‘arithmetical skill is a disposition to enjoy or dislike certain mathematical operations. And that is not true; it is simply a disposition to come to the right answer (Hutchinson 1986: 79). For Hutchinson Aristotles argument is unsuccessful merely because it is too vague, a vagueness which allows for the arithmetical comparison to be made, and this would not be a fault suffered if the argument was constructed with more care. Ultimately, this means that although th e argument is open to criticism, it leaves Aristotle quite confident in his claim that virtue is a form of character, created by the repeated habit of choosing the correct moral path that of the virtue at the mean point between two vices. And it is this mean point which will ultimately lead to eudaimonia. As long as pleasure is taken in moderation, it can still be synonymous with virtue, and allows for pleasure to be a part of our eudaimonia, the ultimate goal of human flourishing. Virtue and Pleasure in Kant For Kant being virtuous means acting in accordance with duty, for dutys sake, and not due to some other motivation in the place of duty (even if the same action would result).There are some philosophers (I will go into detail further on) who have claimed that Kants notion of duty eliminates the possibility of pleasure that is, if you take pleasure in any said action, it eliminates any dutiful intent that was previously present. However, I do not believe this is actually what Kant meant, and in this chapter I will explain why I believe this and attempt to elucidate exactly what Kant meant when he talked about duty, and the implications this has for our conception of pleasure. For Kant, an action can only have moral worth (i.e. be virtuous) if and only if it is done from duty, for dutys sake. So, in order to understand exactly when we can claim under Kants theory that we are being virtuous, we need to understand exactly how we are meant to do our duty, and to do this, we need to examine the categorical imperative. Although Kant does state that there is only one categorical imperative, ‘he offers three different formulas of that law (Sullivan 1989: 149) so sometimes in philosophy the term is used more generally to describe these three formulas (and their associated examples) as a whole, rather than just the first formula by itself. Kant states that ‘there is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative (Kant 1987: 4:421), but what is it, and how does he come to this conclusion? As I mentioned before, any categorical imperative must be synthetic because defining our morality depends on being able to formulate a synthetic a priori principle. A synthetic principle adds something new to our knowledge, and if it is also a priori, it means that this new knowledge does not depend on experience we are able to deduce this synthetic principle independently of any particular experience; we are able to deduce it by examining what we already know to be true about the world. This is because, for Kant, moral judgements are based on how the world ought to be, not how it is, so we cannot depend on our experiences of the world as it is to show us how the world should instead be. Morality cannot be based on experience, because we need an ethical theory that is capable of telling us what we should do, even in entirely n ew circumstances. The categorical imperative is essentially a law, because while everything in the world is subject to the laws of nature, only rational beings possess autonomy, possess a â€Å"(free) will†, so are capable of choosing to act according to any given law. ‘The idea of an objective principle in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command of reason, and the formula of the command is called an imperative. (Russell 2007: 644) Therefore, a theory of practical morality would be a theory of commands about how to act according to certain laws. A theory of morality would be a theory consisting of imperatives. Kant refers to his categorical imperative as the only one, because ‘logically there can be only one ultimate moral law [although] each of the three formulas emphasizes a different aspect of the same moral law (Sullivan 1989: 49). The aim of the Groundwork is to prove that such a principle (what Kant calls the categorical imperative) does exist. Such a principle would be the supreme principle of morality (Kant 1997: 4:392), in other words, the categorical imperative is synonymous with morality. Kant describes the categorical imperative, through three different formulas. The first is the formula of the universal law ‘act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (Kant 1997: 4:421). This law is Kants ‘single categorical imperative (Kant 1997: 4:421); however this is not exactly what our duty is, since the ‘universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). This means that in order for something to be our duty, it must be determined in accordance with universal laws, because duty is not subjective to each individual, but is something that is the same fo r all rational beings, in so far as we are rational. This means that our duty can and should be phrased as: ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). Kant uses four examples Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant The Relation between Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Introduction ‘Every action and choice is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. (Aristotle: 1094a1-3). Philosophy has always been concerned with trying to determine why we do the actions we do: what are we hoping to achieve by performing certain actions? The above quote is Aristotles opening sentence in the Nicomachean ethics, but how are we actually meant to achieve this good that we are aiming for? Many people in the world would be happy to support the claim that the good is achieved by being virtuous but what exactly does this entail? For Aristotle, ‘moral excellence comes about as a result of habit (Aristotle: 1103a16-17) and ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2). It then seems we are safe to claim that the good, (â€Å"moral excellence†), corresponds with happiness, but was he right? And does this happiness include pleasure, or is it excluded? Are virtue and pleasure synonymous? Can they even exist harmoniously at all? Throughout the history of thought, philosophers have attempted to discern that element of human nature that can be most aptly described as the action of taking pleasure in doing certain actions, and in the consequences that arise from any given action. The role of virtue in this pleasure process has been assessed and criticised for hundreds of years; does being virtuous give us pleasure, or does pleasure distract us from doing virtuous things? Is happiness the key to a moral life? My aim in this essay is to address these questions, and related questions, according to the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle. In doing so, I aim to discover what the relation between virtue and pleasure really is, according to these two philosophers. My aim is to discover what the role is of both virtue and pleasure, and the connection between them, in the works of both philosophers, and try to establish where the two philosophies align, and where they are incompatible. At first, it seems as though both philosophers are wholly incompatible in their views of where our morality, our motivation to strive for the good, comes from. Even how the two define what the good is seems to differ too much to offer any similarities. As I briefly mentioned in my opening paragraph, for Aristotle, the purpose of human life is the good, and ‘the highest of all goods achievable by action is happiness. And [many] identify living well and faring well with being happy (Aristotle: 1095a16-19). For Kant however, the question of morality is wrapped up in the concept of â€Å"duty† ‘he does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth (Kant 1997: 4:398). In this essay I will explain exactly what both meant, and critically assess their ideas, with the ultimate goal of somehow reconciling the two seemingly opposing viewpoints. In the process of doing this I will first give an explanation of the foundations of these views what part of each philosophers lifes work these ideas about morality have arisen from. Background When examining any philosophical theory I think it is of vital importance to understand how those particular ideas have been formed what part of the writers thought and theories have these ideas originated from? In this section, I will give a brief overview of whereabouts in their respective works do Kant and Aristotle expound their views on morality, in reference to both pleasure and virtue. Aristotles Nicomachean ethics is part of his practical philosophy (along with his Eudemian ethics), and is primarily a search for what the ultimate goal of human life is. Aristotle was a student of Plato, and as such was likely to have been influenced by his philosophy. It is nothing new to philosophy to be preoccupied with morality. Arguably Platos greatest work, The Republic is fundamentally an inquiry into morality and justice, and what sort of society would be best for cultivating â€Å"the moral man†. In book II of The Republic, Plato tells a story of the mythical ring of Gyges, which is a ring that renders the wearer invisible. Glaucon (the teller of this story in the dialogue) claims that no man, no matter how virtuous or just he is, could resist acting immorally if there was no danger of punishment (Plato: 359c-360c). Glaucon does not believe that any man who had no consequences to face would be moral his claim is that we are moral because society forces us to be so, through fear of being reprimanded. In this case, morality becomes a social construct, and has nothing to do with the singular man who would dismiss moral behaviour in an instant if he believed he could avoid castigation. Aristotles ethics do not follow this way of reasoning, he believes that man can be moral within himself, and also that a man is not virtuous simply by performing virtuous actions, ‘his action must [also] proceed from a firm and unchangeable character (Aristotle: 1105a32-33). Aristotle is often misquoted about what he really meant, due to a mistranslation of the original Greek. Aristotle describes the goal of human life as eudaimonia, which is oft translated as happiness. However, the original meaning of this word is something more akin to being ‘blessed as regards ones own spirit (Pakaluk 2005: 47), or more literally, human flourishing. Pakaluk (2005) goes on to explain the fundamental differences between our commonplace definition of happiness and how we must understand it as a translation of eudaimonia. Most importantly we must understand that Aristotles happiness is not a hedonistic happiness where ‘pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper end of act ion (OED 1989). Eudaimonia is a stable, lasting condition, one that does not fluctuate according to day-to-day events it is an ultimate goal rather than a temporary one. It is also objectively universal it is not a subjective condition based upon the wants of each individual it is a state of being, not a mood or inclination, which is similar for all human beings and is characterised as living well ‘the happy man lives well and fares well (Aristotle: 1098b20). Aristotles definition of virtue is also similarly misunderstood. The original Greek is arete which means ‘any sort of excellence or distinctive power (Pakaluk 2005: 5). Thus being a virtuous person means possessing a certain sort of excellence (of character) which leads us to act virtuously. This form of morality bases the value of any action on the character of the agent an agent must be ‘a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or non-actions (Pojman 2002: 160). We cannot take morality from the actions in themselves, because virtue can be demonstrated through the conscious omission of any certain action morality must instead be based upon the agent. For Kant, his views of how pleasure can affect the goodness, or virtue, of any action can be found most clearly in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The Groundwork (1786) comes between the two different versions of the Critique of Pure Reason that were published (1781 and 1787), and there is certainly a crossover of concepts, with Kant utilising some of the arguments of the Critique in the Groundwork. Namely, his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, respectively, the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us. This distinction between the true essence of things, and their appearances provides us with ‘two standpoints from which [man] can regard himself and cognize laws for all of his actions (Kant 1987: 4:452). The aim of the Groundwork is to ‘proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle (Kant 1997: 4:392). In other words, Kant wants to start from the common perception that every action has some sort of moral value and discover what the underlying principle of morality is, that causes this presupposition. This supreme principle that we uncover must be a synthetic a priori one we must be able to deduce it from what we already know, because we are trying to discern how we ought to be from the evidence of how we are. The Groundwork is the quest to discover what this principle is. According to Kant a virtuous person is someone who performs the right actions for the right reasons (which seems to be similar with Aristotles view the action itself does not hold any value the value instead lies within the agents intent). A person who acts thus demonstrates a good will, which is the only thing to which we attribute total merit ‘It is impossible to think of anything that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Kant 1997: 4:393). This good will possesses worth completely independently of any circumstances, both the means and the ends are good. ‘Even if this will should yet achieve nothing, then [it is still] something that has it full worth in itself In other words, the good will does not need to achieve its end in order to be good, merely the attempt is so. Kant then introduces the concept of duty in order to explain how we are able to manifest the good will in our actions. The concept of duty ‘contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making in unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly (Kant 1997: 4:397). If we do our duty from duty (i.e. for its own sake, because it is the right thing to do, rather than due to some other inclination or motivating desire) then we are doing the right actions for the right reasons we are being virtuous. Kant uses formulations of his categorical imperative in order to demonstrate how we can determine what our duty is, although I will not go into them in this chapter. Kant shows that any system used to deduce our duty must be categorical, and not hypothetical, because a hypothetical imperative tells you how to achieve a certain end if you will x, then you must also will y in order to be able to achieve x. A hypothetical imperative is conditional, it depends on something else. A categorical imperative cannot be so it tells us what we ought to do unconditionally, not on the condition of something else. Kant uses his formulations of the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate when we can say an act is done from duty or not. If an act is done from duty for dutys sake, then it is a virtuous action, if not, then it is not, even if the action is not necessarily â€Å"bad†. Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle Virtue can be taken to have several different meanings; the dictionary definition is ‘conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality; voluntary observance of the recognized moral laws or standards of right conduct; abstention on moral grounds from any form of wrong-doing or vice (OED 1989). For Aristotle the idea of virtue is the mean between two vices, stray but a little from the middle, and you are no longer being wholly virtuous. This Aristotelian view of virtue is often seen as in direct opposition to the Kantian view of virtue that the virtuous man is the man who acts solely from the motivation of wanting to do his duty, without enjoying the act at all. I will explain in full whether this common view of Kantian ethics is correct in the following chapter, and in this chapter I will explain what I mean by my definition of Aristotelian virtue, and exactly what that signifies in relation to pleasure. Aristotles ethics are usually defined as virtue ethics they are agent centred, and depend (like Kant) not on the act that is done, but instead on what sort of person we need to be, what sort of character we need to have, in order to be able to commit virtuous acts. Aristotle starts off the Nicomachean ethics by trying to discern what the goal of human life is, and in book one manages to come up with what standards he thinks this goal must adhere to what are the characteristics this ultimate goal must have in order to be classed as such? Aristotle states that ‘we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be: for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else (Aristotle: 1097a34-1097b1). Our ultimate goal, the highest good, must be desired for itself only, and not as a means to something else. Aristotle refers to this ultimate goal of human life as eudaimonia, but what does this really mean? Does eudaimonia equate to hedonistic pleasure? Accordingly to Aristotle, eudaimonia is not synonymous with pleasure, he states that ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2), so happiness is the achievement of pure excellence, or of complete virtuousness. Human flourishing is what we achieve when we successfully fulfil the human function when we excel at what it is that makes us distinctly human. This means, that in order to understand this ‘human flourishing which is the ultimate goal of human life, we also need to understand the function of human beings ‘Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. (Aristotle: 1097b22-25). Aristotle believed that everything in the world has an â€Å"ergon†, a function, which is ‘that for the sake of which it exists; therefore the achieving of this work, or, more precisely, its doing so well, is its good; but only a good thing of a kind achieves its function well (Pakaluk 2005: 75). For example, the function of a knife is to cut things, so a good knife must be able to cut things well, therefore a good knife must be sharp. If there is to be a human function, then it will be what makes us essentially human what it is that separates us from everything el se in the world the thing that we are best capable of. But what makes Aristotle believe that humans necessarily have to have a function? Aristotle claims that it is merely common sense that man should have a function, because everything else in the world does ‘Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and man has none? Is he naturally functionless? (Aristotle: 1097b29-30). It seems clear that man must have a function just as any other thing does. So what is this function? If something only achieves its function well if it possesses the certain virtues that make it a good thing of its kind (like sharpness for the knife) then the human function must be something that is best achieved by humans more than anything else in the world. Or even, it may be something that is only achievable by human beings. ‘A virtue is a trait that makes a thing of a certain kind good and in view of which we call a thing of that kind â€Å"good†. (Pakaluk 2005: 75). In this way, Aristotles function argument follows on to an investigation into what qualities human beings possess, what virtues they possess in their character, that makes them distinctively human. In order to find out what the human function is, we need to find something that is distinctive to humans. It cannot be merely living, as that is shared with even plants, and it cannot be perception, because although that rules out plants, it still includes the animal kingdom. Instead the human function must be ‘an active life of the element that has a rational principle (Aristotle: 1098a3-4). In other words the human function, that element of human beings which is characteristic to us alone, is our capability to reason; our rationality. Of course, this definition of the human function as rationality causes some problems in the case of people who have diminished rationality what does this mean for them? Take, for example, the mentally handicapped who have reduced capacities of reason through no fault of their own are they really less capable of living fulfilling and flourishing lives than â€Å"normal† people? Are they â€Å"less good†? It seems as though, according to this argument, we are required to count them as worth less. However, I will not dwell on this problem, as I am more concerned with what this idea of a function implies for the role of pleasure in Aristotles ethics. What then, does it mean that the human function is our capacity to reason? The human function is what we must achieve excellence in, in order to be â€Å"good† (just as the knife must achieve excellence in its function of sharpness, in order to be a good knife). This means that morality, and consequently virtue, are intrinsically linked to the human function, to our rationality it is our reason that allows us to achieve virtue. We must use our reason in order to discern what is virtuous. Our function of rationality is what allows us to achieve our excellence, to achieve our virtue. So how does our reason allow us to achieve our virtue? It allows us to choose whatever course of action we feel would allow us best to achieve our happiness, our telos (ultimate goal). Hursthouse (1991) reads Aristotle as meaning that an action is regarded as â€Å"right† because it is what a virtuous person would choose to do, but is it not the other way round? Does a virtuous person not choose to do certain acts because they are good? This problem is obviously reminiscent of Euthyphros dilemma from the platonic dialogue of the same name is a certain act considered good because God says it is so, or does God say it is so because it is good. For Aristotle the ability to choose the morally right action in any situation is an ability to follow the moral mean ‘that moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense is it so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency (Aristotle: 1109a1-3). So for example, the virtue of bravery is the mean between cowardice and rashness. Aristotle also states that virtue is dependent on our character if we have the right character we will be predisposed to commit actions of the right sort. ‘Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit states arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind (Aristotle: 1103b20-22). Therefore, if we habitually perform the right sort of action, then we will generate the right sort of character, thus enabling us to almost automatically choose the correct action, which sits in the middle of this scale between virtue and vice. Our eudaimonia is more and m ore fulfilled by each instance in which our character â€Å"automatically† chooses the virtuous action. Does this idea of virtue as the mean between two vices imply that pleasure is then a vice, being the vice at one end of the scale of the virtue of moderation, whilst the other end is despair? A virtue can be best described as the course of action that allows us to achieve our eudaimonia. So is pleasure more suited to this task than despair (if we take despair to be the other end of the scale)? Would the mean on the scale in actuality lie closer to the end of pleasure than the other? Is this a purely arithmetical mean, the exact midpoint between two extremes, or is it something more flexible? Just as everyone requires different amounts of food in their everyday life (such that everyones â€Å"mean† between scarcity and gluttony differs), would it not make sense that the mean of enjoyment is different for everyone as well? Such that enjoyment of life, whilst it does not mean a slavish commitment to complete hedonistic pleasure, could mean that pleasure does play an important rol e in our lives. I believe that Aristotle would agree with me here, since he states that ‘no one nature or state is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue the same pleasure (Aristotle: 1153b29-30). In other words, we do not all desire the same pleasures to the same degree, instead we pursue only those pleasures which are best suited to helping each of us, as an individual, to achieve our eudaimonia. We can therefore agree with Shermans reading of Aristotle, that ‘moral habituation is the cultivation of fine (or noble) pleasures and pains (Sherman 1989: 190). In this way, virtuousness does not mean a complete abandonment of all pleasure, but instead tells us that we should be interested in only those pleasures which are â€Å"worthy† of the rational mind. In some ways this bears similarity with Mills recalculation of Benthams utilitarianism that some pleasures (of the intellect) are worth more in the hedonic calculus than mere physical pleasures (Mill 2001). However, appreciation of the right pleasures is a taught skill also. By that I mean one of habit, such as virtue is according to Aristotle, and as such ‘we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained in the things that we ought (Aristotle: 1104b11-13). What is slightly problematic is that Aristotle gives two seemingly wholly different accounts of what pleasure is. In Book II he states that ‘it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things (Aristotle: 1104b10), by this meaning that a love of pleasure for itself will lead us to ignore the virtuous path and live a life of pure hedonism, thus failing to achieve our telos of eudaimonia. In Book VII he states that ‘the view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket (Aristotle: 1153a17-18). This view is nonsensical, and would lead us to having to avoiding almost every type of activity. Some pleasures are bad, but this does not necessarily make all pleasures bad. However, whilst these two accounts do differ, there is a common theme between them, which is that pleasure is not necessarily bad, and can exist in harmony with virtue. However, we need to qualify exactly what pleasures we mean here, as not all pleasure can be called good. Annas (1980) interprets Aristotle as believing that pleasure is only good when done by the virtuousness man, because the habit of his character will lead him to only choose to act on those pleasures which are virtuous ‘it is right for the good man to seek pleasure; pleasure will point him in the right direction. (Annas 1980: 286). Whereas the man who is immoral in habit will only persue those pleasures which ‘confirm the deplorable tendencies of [him], since it will strengthen his habits of wickedness and weakness (Annas 1980: 286-7). Here, the important point is not that we need to avoid pleasure, but that we need to be sure that we are pursuing the right kind of pleasure before we act upon it the pl easure of the virtuous man, not the deplorable man. The obvious problem with this interpretation is that Annas at first glance seems to be claiming that only a good person can access pleasure in a good way. Where does this leave the immoral man who wishes to reform his character? Is there no possibility that he will be able to choose those pleasures that are good for his character? Is this what Aristotle is really saying when he claims that virtue is a matter of habit, of character? ‘If the things [the good man] finds tiresome seem pleasant to someone, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this condition. (Aristotle: 1176a19-22). This quote for one certainly seems to be suggesting that the virtuous man will be able to steer clear of immoral pleasures, whilst the immoral man will not. Aristotle emphasizes several times the fact that his ethics is based upon repeated behaviour, on habit, and ‘a short time [or virtuousness], does not make a man blessed or happy (Aristotle: 1098a18-19). What this means is that a period of immorality in a mans life does not necessarily preclude him from ever achieving his eudaimonia, and similarly, a brief period of virtuousness does not make a man wholly virtuous. Aristotles ethics is a system of right and wrong that demonstrates itself through habit, and habits can change, although it may be hard to dispose of bad habits, of immoral habits, because ‘it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion [for immoral pleasures] (Aristotle:1105a2-3). This does not mean that it is impossible, indeed it must be possible to change our character, otherwise what we are taught in our youth would be how we remain for life, meaning that whether we become a good or a bad person depends mor e on our teachers, rather than any attempt at morality by ourselves. We cannot be deprived of a chance at our eudaimonia just because we fail to receive the right training of character in our youth. It must be possible to reform and for the immoral man to pursue good pleasure or how else can he become a man who chooses only good pleasures out of habit? Some might claim that this seems unfair. If moral virtue is merely an act brought about by habit, then it is far easier for the good man to be virtuous that it is for the bad man to be so so where is the incentive for the bad man to change his ways and attempt to cultivate the right sort of character in order to be good by habit? But ‘even the good is better when it is harder (Aristotle: 1105a10), and the bad man will be rewarded if he perseveres. If a bad man successfully changes his character to that of the virtuous man, then he is satisfying the human function, the human ergon, and he will be able to achieve the ultimate telos for human beings eudaimonia his human flourishing. The incentive for the bad man to change his ways, no matter how difficult it may be, is that he will achieve the ultimate goal of complete happiness. In this way does the right sort of pleasure, lead first to the cultivation of a habit of character of complete excellence or virtue, which in turn then leads to ultimate happiness. However, as Hutchinson (1986) points out, there is a problem with this idea that, ultimately, restraint over which pleasures we decide to pursue is how we describe virtue. If ‘discipline produces virtue and, when misguided, defect of character, by means of pleasure and pain, the virtues (and vices) are dispositions for enjoying and disliking things (Hutchinson 1986: 79). Hutchinson goes on to state that this cannot be so, because children are rewarded in the study of arithmetic through pleasure and pain. So then ‘arithmetical skill is a disposition to enjoy or dislike certain mathematical operations. And that is not true; it is simply a disposition to come to the right answer (Hutchinson 1986: 79). For Hutchinson Aristotles argument is unsuccessful merely because it is too vague, a vagueness which allows for the arithmetical comparison to be made, and this would not be a fault suffered if the argument was constructed with more care. Ultimately, this means that although th e argument is open to criticism, it leaves Aristotle quite confident in his claim that virtue is a form of character, created by the repeated habit of choosing the correct moral path that of the virtue at the mean point between two vices. And it is this mean point which will ultimately lead to eudaimonia. As long as pleasure is taken in moderation, it can still be synonymous with virtue, and allows for pleasure to be a part of our eudaimonia, the ultimate goal of human flourishing. Virtue and Pleasure in Kant For Kant being virtuous means acting in accordance with duty, for dutys sake, and not due to some other motivation in the place of duty (even if the same action would result).There are some philosophers (I will go into detail further on) who have claimed that Kants notion of duty eliminates the possibility of pleasure that is, if you take pleasure in any said action, it eliminates any dutiful intent that was previously present. However, I do not believe this is actually what Kant meant, and in this chapter I will explain why I believe this and attempt to elucidate exactly what Kant meant when he talked about duty, and the implications this has for our conception of pleasure. For Kant, an action can only have moral worth (i.e. be virtuous) if and only if it is done from duty, for dutys sake. So, in order to understand exactly when we can claim under Kants theory that we are being virtuous, we need to understand exactly how we are meant to do our duty, and to do this, we need to examine the categorical imperative. Although Kant does state that there is only one categorical imperative, ‘he offers three different formulas of that law (Sullivan 1989: 149) so sometimes in philosophy the term is used more generally to describe these three formulas (and their associated examples) as a whole, rather than just the first formula by itself. Kant states that ‘there is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative (Kant 1987: 4:421), but what is it, and how does he come to this conclusion? As I mentioned before, any categorical imperative must be synthetic because defining our morality depends on being able to formulate a synthetic a priori principle. A synthetic principle adds something new to our knowledge, and if it is also a priori, it means that this new knowledge does not depend on experience we are able to deduce this synthetic principle independently of any particular experience; we are able to deduce it by examining what we already know to be true about the world. This is because, for Kant, moral judgements are based on how the world ought to be, not how it is, so we cannot depend on our experiences of the world as it is to show us how the world should instead be. Morality cannot be based on experience, because we need an ethical theory that is capable of telling us what we should do, even in entirely n ew circumstances. The categorical imperative is essentially a law, because while everything in the world is subject to the laws of nature, only rational beings possess autonomy, possess a â€Å"(free) will†, so are capable of choosing to act according to any given law. ‘The idea of an objective principle in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command of reason, and the formula of the command is called an imperative. (Russell 2007: 644) Therefore, a theory of practical morality would be a theory of commands about how to act according to certain laws. A theory of morality would be a theory consisting of imperatives. Kant refers to his categorical imperative as the only one, because ‘logically there can be only one ultimate moral law [although] each of the three formulas emphasizes a different aspect of the same moral law (Sullivan 1989: 49). The aim of the Groundwork is to prove that such a principle (what Kant calls the categorical imperative) does exist. Such a principle would be the supreme principle of morality (Kant 1997: 4:392), in other words, the categorical imperative is synonymous with morality. Kant describes the categorical imperative, through three different formulas. The first is the formula of the universal law ‘act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (Kant 1997: 4:421). This law is Kants ‘single categorical imperative (Kant 1997: 4:421); however this is not exactly what our duty is, since the ‘universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). This means that in order for something to be our duty, it must be determined in accordance with universal laws, because duty is not subjective to each individual, but is something that is the same fo r all rational beings, in so far as we are rational. This means that our duty can and should be phrased as: ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). Kant uses four examples